From the Front Desk

A big thank you to Nicole Innes, Thomas Toay and Francois Cloete for holding the fort over the festive season it gave us the chance to have a break from pilots and spend sometime with family instead.

However, we are back in full force so make sure your account is paid up to date or your wings will be clipped...

Course Dates

Here are the course dates for 2009,  reduced rates for refresher courses are available. Please make sure you give your name to reception if you would like to attend.

Social / Wings Party

Join us on Friday the 20th of February at 18h30 for another famous Cape Town Flying Club Social & Wings Party! The bar will be open and food available.

Fly In to FAOH

We've organized a fly in to Oudtshoorn (FAOH) from 28 February - 1 March. A bar and braai packs will be arranged. Camping is allowed or you may stay in the Queen's Hotel (044 272 2101). We'll also be enjoying some night circuits at the airfield.

Please RSVP to Beverley, (021) 934-0257 by Monday 23 February.

New Delta200 Boundaries

Contributed by Anthony Allen

Aviation Accidents: The Hudson Hero

Submitted by Alexia Michaelides

The author of the report below is a captain of the larger A340 (4 engined) airbus.

Reports state geese were flying at 2900'. This would imply that the A320 would have already cleaned up from its original take off flap setting (most likely config 1 which would have a small amount of flap on the trailing edge and a small amount of slat on the leading edge) to a clean configuration and acceleration to 250 kts indicated airspeed, the maximum permitted speed below 10,000' in the US.

The engines would have been in the 'climb gate' which means that the autothrust system would be engaged with the FMGES (flight management, guidance and envelope system) computers able to automatically set thrust to whatever it requires between idle and approx 90% of the maximum continuous thrust.

The co-pilot was the pilot flying (PF) for this sector with the captain playing the pilot non-flying (PNF) support role (radios, monitoring, system selection, etc). On fly by wire (FBW) Airbuses  (Airbii?) the autopilot can be engaged from the later of 100' or 5 seconds after take off but most of us like to play awhile so I don't know if it was engaged or if PF was hand flying at the time.

It would appear that on hitting the birds the power loss on both engines was instantaneous. I would expect that the flight deck would momentarily have gone dark with all the screens blank while the electrical system reconfigured itself onto battery power.
During this time a small ram air turbine (RAT) would drop out from the underside of the aircraft with a freewheeling propeller that spins up to 6000ish rpm in the airflow.

Modern Airbus have 3 electrical systems referred to as the Green, Blue and Yellow systems (you can't afford to be colour blind in an Airbus!) with hydraulic dependent systems spread across these 3 providers to allow system redundancy. The engines have pumps attached that normally pressurise the 3 hydraulic systems to 3000 psi
However these engines had now stopped so the RAT would supply hydraulic pressure at 2500 psi to the blue hydraulic system only. With only the blue system available the aircraft would have had both elevators but only the left aileron operational (the rudder is electric on the 320 so other redundancy caters for that). The loss of all the engine driven electrical generators would also cause the emergency generator to come on line. This is a small generator that is driven by blue system hydraulic pressure (effectively a windmill in the fluid lines) with enough output to power minimal flight instrumentation, flight control computers, FADEC's (computers governing thrust management), SFCC's (slat/flap control computers), etc, etc. The emergency generator means that the batteries can be saved for any future needs as they are only guaranteed for 30 minutes.

So at this point the aircraft has flight controls and limited electrics.
There would then be the most awful buzz of aural warnings and illuminations as the aircraft then reports itself to the pilots as being unfit for use. If the autopilot was engaged it would have dropped out and as the only pilot instrumentation showing would be  the captains PFD (primary flight display) and the ISIS (integrated standby instrument system) he would now become the PF while the co-pilot now became the PNF.

(Remember – Airbus does not have a conventional control yoke which you wrestle with 2 arms, but a diddy little sidestick using fingers)
In normal circumstances Airbus flight guidance is unlike conventional aircraft as forward and backward movement of the sidestick does not directly control the elevators but does directly control g load demand. Lateral movement of the sidestick does not directly control the ailerons, it sends a request to the flight control computers for a desired roll rate. There are also flight envelope protections in place controlled by the flight control computers that prevent the aircraft exceeding preset pitch and bank angles, min and max speeds, min and max g loadings, etc and when all these are in place the aircraft is referred to as operating in 'Normal Law'. There are another 6 'laws' that the aircraft can fly under (alternate 1, alternate 2, flare, abnormal attitude, mechanical backup) including the reversionary mode the aircraft would have dropped into in this case, 'Direct Law'. In this mode the sidestick movement is effectively directly related to aileron and elevator movement and in effect the aircraft has downgraded itself 3 stages to handle the same as a normal aeroplane. We even have to start trimming!

The aircraft appears to have reached a max alt of 3200' before  transitioning to the glide. The Captain is now hand flying and will also have taken over the radios while the FO now has the job of dealing with the systems and failures. The Airbus has a system called ECAM (electronic centralised aircraft monitoring) which not only displays normal aircraft system information on 2 screens in front of the pilots in the middle of the panel but also automatically presents checklists and operation procedures during failures scenarios. The upper ECAM screen would be awash with pages and pages of procedures for him to work through however the aircraft will prioritise the failures and put the engine relight procedures at the top of the list

The ECAM would instruct him to:

• Switch on the engine igniters. Jet engines operate with the 'spark  plugs' normally switched off as they are a constantly burning fire unlike a piston engine. Relight will not happen without a spark though.
• 2) Return the thrust levers to idle for correct fuel delivery during  start sequence.
• 3) Request PF to fly at 280kts which is the optimum speed for relight. In light of the low altitude I very much doubt they would have wanted to do this. If they had they would have needed a target pitch attitude of approx 2.5 degrees nose down and assuming a weight of 70 tonnes in still air the glide would have been 2.6nm per 1000'.

I suspect the captain would in fact have come back to 'green dot' speed for improved gliding range. Green dot speed is computer generated and displayed as a green dot on the speedtape on the PFD and shows you the exact speed for max lift/drag ratio for that weight in the ambient conditions in the current configuration.  I would hazard a guess that on a little Airbus (minibus!?!) this would be just over 200 knots.

• 4) Select the emergency generator manually on in case the system has not come on automatically.
• 5) Use number 1 VHF or HF radios and Transponder as only those are powered in emergency electrical configuration.
• 6) Reset number 1 Flight Augmentation Computer allowing recovery of the electrical rudder trim as the unpowered right aileron would now start to float up   hampering control further.
• 7) If no engine relight after 30 seconds then engine master switches off for 30 seconds to purge the combustion chambers before restarting the ignition sequence. Below FL200 the APU can be used to  assist with engine starting however even if the APU had been running it would not be able to be used within 45 seconds of loss of engine driven generators to prevent interference with emergency generator coupling.

At some point the crew would then have to accept their fate that the  engines are unlikely to restart and transfer to the Ditching checklist which is not on ECAM but would have to be accessed from the QRH (quick reference handbook) located to the side of each pilot.

Now the FO had a new list of jobs to perform:

• Prepare cabin and cockpit. Ensure cabin crew are notified and doing their thing, secure loose items in the cockpit, prepare survival equipment, tighten harness and select harness lock, etc.
• Switch GPWS (ground proximity warning systems) and EGPWS (enhanced  GPWS) systems off so that the aircraft does not start shouting 'Too Low Gear' or 'Whoop Whoop Pull Up' at you when you are  trying to concentrate on a tidy crash.
• Seatbelt signs on. Somehow think this one got into the checklist to appease the lawyers at the subsequent board of enquiry!
• Turn off cabin and galley electrical power.
• Select landing elevation to zero on pressurisation control panel as this would currently be set to the landing elevation at the planned arrival airfield. If the aircraft was still pressurised on ditching it might not be possible to open the doors.

The QRH advises the crew to ditch with the gear retracted and the flaps set to the max available setting (normally called Config Full).  On the A340 we can achieve Config Full as our RAT supplies the Green hydraulic system. However, looking through the A320 manuals where the RAT supplies the Blue system I can only see a capability to deploy the leading edge slats only.  It would be possible to get Config Full by manually switching on the Yellow system electric hydraulic pump to pressurise the Yellow system and then via a PTU (power transfer unit) the Green system would also be powered but this is not SOP so I suspect the aircraft may have ditched with slats deployed and flaps retracted but don't take that as gospel.

At 2000'agl the FO then:

• 1 - Check that the cabin pressurisation mode selector is in AUTO.
• 2 - Switch all engine and APU bleed valves off.
• 3 - Switch on the overhead 'DITCHING' pushbutton. The outflow valve, the emergency ram air inlet, the avionics ventilation inlet and extract valves, the pack flow control valves and the forward cargo outlet isolation valve all close to slow the ingress of water.

At 1000'agl the FO then:

• Makes 'Cabin crew seats for landing' PA.

At 200'agl the FO then:

• Makes 'Brace for impact' PA.

At touchdown the FO then:

• Engine master switches off.
• APU master switch off.

After ditching:

• Notify ATC.
• Press all engine and APU fire pushbuttons to arm fire extinguisher squibs and isolate fuel, hydraulic, pneumatic and electrical couplings.
• Discharge all engine and APU fire extinguishers.
• Initiate evacuation.

I have left out a lot of the explanatory text from the QRH for brevity but you can see that this is an almighty amount of work to achieve in an ultimate pressure scenario.  I have not even touched upon the proper evacuation checklist.

I have also done Monsieur Airbus an injustice but drastically simplifying my explanations of the key systems in an attempt to make them more understandable but I hope it is of interest to those that made it to the end of the text!

In my company we do practice this event in the simulator for both ditching and crash on land. In fact I last did a 4 engine inop landing in the simulator just 6 months ago having simulated a departure from Tokyo followed by a volcanic ash ingestion at FL250 in the climb leading to 4 engine flame out with unsuccessful relight attempts.
We ran the exercise twice and both times managed to successfully glide back to Tokyo with the only damaged being burst main wheels from hammering the brakes. We practice many, many other horrendous scenarios (such as flying the aircraft to successful airport landings with the loss of all power to the flight control surfaces) so you can see that the only subjects that we are not prepared for are the ones we haven't thought of yet.

Hats off to the entire crew for a most amazing job done brilliantly and top marks to Airbus for showing all the doubting Thomas's that they were so very wrong about the strength of the aircraft.

• Wikipedia Entry: US Airways Flight 1549
• Youtube video of ditching & ATC recording
• Preleminary NTSB Report

Aviation History: Happy 40th Birthday to the Boeing 747

Submitted by John Nicholas

An object of boyish wonder, an aviation milestone, a sea-change for cheap air travel, a Jumbo of a plane, the Boeing 747 celebrates its 40th birthday.

Four decades ago, Boeing's prototype 747 took to the skies over Washington State for a flight lasting some 75 minutes.

The aircraft, named City of Everett after the location of the factory where it was manufactured, handled well. And so was born the aircraft which has become an icon of the aviation industry and helped bring cheap airline travel to millions of people.

I remember as a small boy at the time, watching awestruck a BBC documentary about the development of the 747. The music used to convey the imposing size of the aircraft was Prokofiev's Dance of the Knights - familiar today from the opening sequence of the Apprentice.

What then made the 747 unique was that it was the first "wide body" aircraft - it had more than one aisle. Today this is the norm for most long haul (and some short haul) aircraft. But at the time it was a big step towards reducing any sense of travelling in a narrow tube, and inducing a sense more equivalent to flying in a large room with high ceilings.

Also new was the upper deck, accessed by a spiral staircase. When the aircraft entered service this was initially a rather exclusive bar for first class passengers - today it is more typically used as an additional business or economy class seating area.

The 747 also saw the introduction of "big fan" engines, with an air intake large enough for a person to stand in. These engines were considerably more powerful than earlier generations, but in their early days did experience some problems with overheating.

The upper deck was also the location for the cockpit, requiring pilots to learn new techniques for handling the 747 from this new vantage point, for landing, take off and taxiing around airports

Airports had to adapt to the sheer size of the new plane once it entered service in 1970 with, for example, wider and stronger taxiways and new jetties (the walkways that connect with the plane).

For airlines the big question was whether they would be able to fill the massive increase in seats, with a doubling of capacity compared with previous jet aircraft.

Less glamorous

There were times, particularly in the early 70s when the 747 did seem too big, as airlines struggled after the oil price shocks of the time. But over the years, airlines have been successful in attracting customers with most choosing a 3-class layout with around 350-400 seats.

Against this growth the travel experience has arguably become less glamorous and more frustrating - just think of those times when several 747s arrive at once and disgorge all their passengers and baggage into the arrivals hall.

Nevertheless, since that first flight, the 747 has fulfilled the faith of its designers and has led to reductions in air fares, opening up air travel to many in a way that was previously unimaginable

This has been made possible by the economies of scale which a larger aircraft can offer.

In simple terms the overall costs of operating an aircraft with, say 400 seats, are typically not double those of an aircraft with 200 seats. In effect, the cost per seat is reduced.

On the one hand, the increased size of the 747 necessitated airlines offering lower fares to encourage more customers and on the other, it gave them the economic basis on which to do so profitably. So although we might complain of travelling in "cattle class" we have the 747 to thank for being able to do so at affordable prices.

The 747 has also found a place in popular culture. It is one of the few modern aircraft to have made it into song - "I lost my heart on a 747" (Tom Paxton) and "got on board a westbound seven forty seven" is a line from "It never rains in southern California".

This is an aircraft that has truly made its mark.

Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/7880808.stm

The Boeing 747-8 will soon take the 747 family to new heights

Boeing 747 Facts

• 1,500 planes built or ordered
• 17 million flights made
• 42 billion nautical miles flown
• Equivalent to moon and back 100,000 times
• BA has biggest fleet - 57 of the plane

Termination of satellite monitoring of 121.5 MHz ELTs will happen in under a month. Are you ready?

Submitted by Linda Hodgkinson

Termination of satellite monitoring of 121.5 MHz ELTs will happen in under a month. Are you ready?

On February 1, 2009, the International Cospas-Sarsat Organization [1] (U.S. included) will terminate processing of distress signals emitted by 121.5 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs). Pilots flying aircraft equipped with 121.5 MHz ELTs after that date will have to depend on pilots of over flying aircraft and or ground stations monitoring 121.5 to hear and report distress alert signals, transmitted from a possible crash site.

Currently only 12-15 percent of the registered aircraft in the United States are flying with 406 MHz ELTs. This means that there is at least an 85% chance that an aircraft in an accident will only transmit a 121.5 MHz signal, thus remaining silent to the satellites. It will be up to other pilots monitoring the 121.5 MHz frequency in the cockpit to alert Search and Rescue authorities to accidents involving 121.5. When you fly, look out for your fellow pilots and when possible monitor 121.5 MHz.

If a 121.5 MHz ELT is heard on guard, report to the nearest air traffic control tower, the time and location of when you first detect the ELT, when it is the loudest and when it drops off your radio. Listening and reporting may well be the difference that saves a life.

Cospas-Sarsat System (U.S. included) has been and will continue processing emergency signals transmitted by 406 MHz ELTs. These 5 Watt digital beacons transmit a much stronger signal, are more accurate, verifiable and traceable to the registered beacon owner (406 MHz ELTs must be registered by the owner in accordance with Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulation at www.beaconregistration.noaa.gov ). Registration allows the search and rescue authorities to contact the beacon owner, or his or her designated alternate by telephone to determine if a real emergency exists. Therefore, a simple telephone call often solves a 406 MHz alerts without launching costly and limited search and rescue resources, which would have to be done for a 121.5 MHz alert. For these reasons, the search and rescue community is encouraging aircraft owners to consider retrofit of 406 MHz ELTs or at a minimum, consider the purchase of a handheld 406 MHz Personal Locator Beacon (PLB) which can be carried in the cockpit while continuing to maintain a fixed 121.5 MHz ELT mounted in the aircraft’s tail. Protect yourself and your passengers and Get the Fix… Switch to 406.

Remember, after February 1, 2009, the world-wide Cospas-Sarsat satellite system will no longer process 121.5 MHz alert signals. Pilots involved in aircraft accidents in remote areas will have to depend on pilots of over flying aircraft and or ground stations to hear emergency ELT distress signals. For further information concerning the termination of 121.5 MHz data processing visit www.sarsat.noaa.gov or contact Switchto406@noaa.gov with any questions.

[1] The Cospas-Sarsat Organization provides a satellite based world-wide monitoring system that detects and locates distress signals transmitted by Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs), Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRBs) and Personal Locator Beacons (PLBs). The system includes space and ground segments which process the signals received from the beacon source and forwards the distress alert data to the appropriate RescueCoordinationCenter for action.

Safety Corner

Contributed by Gareth Pinnock

Accidents and incidents never just occur. To borrow a well worn line: "there is a chain of small, seemingly insignificant events, that come together to cause a significant failure".

For every accident or incident that makes it into our club file, there are many occurances that fail to end in an accident, or even in an incident. This is often not due to any particular pilot skill, but just good old fashioned luck. The pilot concerned bet their life, and the lives of their passengers, on one roll of the dice. What is worse, sometimes the pilot (and definitly the passengers) were not aware that fate was indeed the hunter.

The stories presented here are not part of a "name and shame" campaign. We can only gain experience by making mistakes. Unfortunately, we do not live long enough (or fly often enough) to make them all. The stories here are so that you can put yourselves in the pilot's shoes, and see what they went through, and rejoice with them that they came out unscathed – wiser and alive.

The stories here happened to CTFC pilots over the years.

If you have a story that you feel that others can learn from, write it down and send it, anonymously if you like.

When things go dark

Place: Between FACT and FASD
Aircraft: Tomahawk

Two pilots were building some night hours, and doing a nice easy cross country to build those commercial night hours.

On the way to FASD, we had an alternator failure. Immediate pandemonium broke out in the cockpit as we switched off all non essential electrics (and some essential ones..hint: the instrument lights are needed...). Simultaneously I banked the aircraft to the left, with both of us now trying to find the torches (which had been put in the back of the aircraft). By the time one of us had found the torch, we had descended from 2500' to about 800' without noticing. If it had taken us any longer, I like to think we would have noticed, but maybe that is wishful thinking.

Lessons learned:

Electrical failures are rarely sudden, and the plane will fly fine without electrical power. We failed to Aviate, Navigate, Communicate. I immediately turned left (which deprived me of an horizon, since the ocean is rather dark at night).

Both of us neglected to pack torches within easy reach. Both of us then tried to search.

The pilot should always fly the aircraft first. We could actually see the instruments without the aid of a torch (fullish moon), but the electrical failure had now become the main focus of our attention.

Fate had his hand out, somehow we managed to escape him.

Similar accidents in the club's history

None, so far

Pictures

Submitted by Alexia Michaelides & John Nicholas

US Air Flight 1549